WEEK 2 | 8 – 16 August 2026
The second week of August 2026 (8–16 August; the Court did not sit on the weekends of 8–9 and 15–16 August, with 15 August also being the Independence Day holiday, so the week’s business fell entirely within 10–14 August) was dominated by criminal law and commercial jurisprudence, with the Supreme Court extending juvenile justice protections retrospectively, restoring a POCSO life sentence with a forceful reminder that child sexual abuse is “an assault upon humanity,” and clarifying the strict limitation regime governing insolvency claims. The Court also revisited the standard of proof for testamentary documents, imposed exemplary costs on a corporate litigant for prolonging a two-decade-old commercial suit, and affirmed a strict-liability standard in electrocution compensation claims. Together, the week’s rulings reflect the Court’s parallel commitment to protecting the vulnerable while disciplining commercial litigants who misuse procedure.
CRIMINAL LAW • JUVENILE JUSTICE
Dinesh Kumar v. The State of Haryana – SC Holds Juvenile Justice Act Benefit Available Even for Offences Preceding Its Commencement
The Supreme Court held that a person who was below eighteen years of age on the date of an offence — even one committed before 1 April 2001 – is entitled to the protective benefit of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. While affirming the appellant’s conviction under Sections 302/34 and 392/34 IPC in a taxi-driver murder and robbery case, the Court set aside his life sentence, seven-year rigorous imprisonment, and fine, after accepting that he was a juvenile at the time of the offence.
Key Points:
- Juvenile status is determined by age on the date of the offence, regardless of when the JJ Act, 2000 came into force.
- The benefit applies retrospectively even to offences committed before 1 April 2001.
- Conviction may stand while the adult sentence is set aside in favour of juvenile justice disposition.
Exam Relevance: Key reading on the retrospective application of beneficial juvenile justice legislation and Article 20(1) considerations.
Cause Title: Dinesh Kumar v. The State of Haryana | 2026 INSC 842 | 12 August 2026 | Coram: Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ.
CHILD RIGHTS • CRIMINAL LAW • POCSO ACT
Balesh Kumar Kuraiti v. State of Chhattisgarh – SC Restores Life Term, Holds Every Act of Child Sexual Abuse an ‘Assault Upon Humanity’
Restoring a life sentence for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a three-year-old girl, the Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had reduced the sentence to twenty years by retrospectively applying the 2019 POCSO Amendment to an offence committed in 2016. The Court held that applying enhanced penalties retrospectively violates Article 20(1), while clarifying that the restored life sentence need not extend to the offender’s entire natural life absent express stipulation.
Key Points:
- Enhanced statutory penalties under the 2019 POCSO Amendment cannot be applied retrospectively; this violates Article 20(1).
- Every act of child sexual abuse was described as ‘an assault upon humanity itself.’
- A restored life sentence does not automatically mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life absent express words.
Exam Relevance: Essential reading on Article 20(1)’s bar on retrospective penal enhancement, read with Section 6, POCSO Act, 2012.
Cause Title: Balesh Kumar Kuraiti v. State of Chhattisgarh | 2026 INSC 850 | 12 August 2026 | Coram: Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ.
INSOLVENCY LAW • LIMITATION LAW
Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd. – SC Holds IBC Default Occurs at a Singular Point, Rejects Continuing-Injury Theory
Quashing CIRP proceedings initiated under Section 9 IBC over dues dating back to 2011–2012, the Supreme Court held that default under Section 3(12) IBC crystallises at the singular point in time when payment falls due and is not made – an unpaid debt causing continuing financial harm does not amount to a continuing legal injury capable of resetting the limitation clock under Article 137, Limitation Act, 1963. The Court further clarified that unadjudicated claims such as idling or demobilisation charges are unliquidated damages, not operational debt, and cannot found insolvency proceedings without prior judicial determination.
Key Points:
- Default under the IBC occurs at a fixed point in time; it does not create a continuing wrong resetting limitation.
- Contractual milestone dues qualify as operational debt, but unliquidated claims like idling charges do not.
- Insolvency proceedings cannot be used to recover claims requiring prior adjudication of quantum.
Exam Relevance: Central to IBC limitation jurisprudence; read with Section 3(12), IBC and Article 137, Limitation Act, 1963.
Cause Title: Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd. | 2026 INSC 835 | 12 August 2026 | Coram: J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.
SECURITIES LAW • CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
SEBI v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth – SC Holds Trading While in Possession of Confidential Information Is Insider Trading, Irrespective of Profit
Restoring a SEBI Whole Time Member’s order holding company promoters guilty of insider trading, the Supreme Court held that dealing in a company’s securities while informed by confidential, price-sensitive information constitutes insider trading, and that the quantum of profit earned – or its absence – is immaterial to establishing the violation. The ruling reversed a Securities Appellate Tribunal order that had quashed SEBI’s findings against the accused promoters.
Key Points:
- Insider trading is established by dealing in securities while possessing unpublished price-sensitive information.
- Absence of profit, or a modest profit, does not negate the violation once the conduct is established.
- Restores regulatory primacy of SEBI’s factual findings over a more lenient SAT interpretation.
Exam Relevance: Important for Section 15Z, SEBI Act, 1992, and the elements test for insider trading under Indian securities law.
Cause Title: Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth | 2026 INSC 826 | 11 August 2026 | Coram: Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.
SUCCESSION LAW • EVIDENCE LAW
Pazhanathal v. Alamathal – SC Holds Proof of Thumb Impression Under Section 69 Evidence Act Does Not Validate a Will
The Supreme Court held that establishing a testator’s thumb impression and an attesting witness’s handwriting under Section 69, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – a substituted mode of proof used when attesting witnesses cannot be produced – does not create any presumption that the testator understood the Will’s recitals or freely adopted its testamentary scheme. Where propounders fail to satisfactorily explain the unavailability of witnesses or address suspicious circumstances such as exclusion of natural heirs, the document fails as a valid testamentary disposition.
Key Points:
- Section 69 proof is a substituted formal proof mechanism, not a presumption of testamentary validity.
- The statutory gateway between Sections 68 and 69 cannot be bypassed without cogent proof of witness unavailability.
- Suspicious circumstances, such as unexplained exclusion of natural heirs, must be affirmatively removed by propounders.
Exam Relevance: Core reading on Sections 68–69, Evidence Act, 1872, and the doctrine of suspicious circumstances in probate law.
Cause Title: Pazhanathal (Dead) Through LRs. v. Alamathal (Dead) Through LRs. | 2026 INSC 860 | 13 August 2026 | Coram: Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.
ARBITRATION LAW
National Projects Construction Corp. Ltd. v. Ishvakoo (India) Pvt. Ltd. – SC Affirms Award Debtor’s Right to Section 9 Relief in Rare Cases
The Supreme Court affirmed that an unsuccessful award debtor may invoke Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 even after an award, to seek interim protection in rare and compelling circumstances that would otherwise cause irreparable prejudice and undermine a pending Section 34 challenge. Applying this standard, the Court upheld directions requiring the award creditor to deposit ₹3.5 crore – realised by encashing bank guarantees – into court pending the outcome of the debtor’s Section 34 petition.
Key Points:
- Post-award Section 9 relief for an award debtor is available only in rare and compelling circumstances.
- Such relief preserves the efficacy of a pending Section 34 challenge against the award.
- Encashed bank guarantee proceeds may be directed to be deposited in court pending adjudication.
Exam Relevance: Read with Sections 9 and 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on interim protection post-award.
Cause Title: National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. v. Ishvakoo (India) Pvt. Ltd. | 2026 INSC 828 | 11 August 2026 | Coram: K.V. Viswanathan and Alok Aradhe, JJ.
CIVIL PROCEDURE • COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
Reliance Industries Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd. – SC Imposes ₹10 Lakh Costs, Rebukes Litigant’s ‘Unlimited Power to Litigate’
Observing that a corporate litigant’s power to litigate and obstruct the progress of proceedings “seems unlimited,” the Supreme Court imposed costs of ₹10 lakh for conduct delaying a two-decade-old commercial suit concerning the supply of natural gas. The appeal, arising from a Bombay High Court order redacting portions of a witness’s examination-in-chief affidavits, gave the Court occasion to criticise the sustained procedural obstruction of a long-pending commercial dispute.
Key Points:
- Courts may impose substantial costs to check litigants who use procedural manoeuvres to delay long-pending suits.
- A litigant’s resources do not entitle it to obstruct the efficient progress of commercial litigation.
- Signals judicial impatience with two-decade-old commercial disputes remaining unresolved on technical grounds.
Exam Relevance: Illustrates the Court’s costs jurisdiction as a deterrent against abuse of process in commercial litigation.
Cause Title: Reliance Industries Limited v. NTPC Limited | 2026 INSC 862 | 14 August 2026 | Coram: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ.
TORT LAW • COMPENSATION LAW
Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. Rekha – SC Clarifies Electricity Boards Face Strict, Not Absolute, Liability in Electrocution Cases
Hearing appeals against Karnataka High Court orders holding it liable for two electrocution deaths, the Supreme Court clarified that the applicable standard for electricity boards and transmission corporations in electrocution compensation cases is strict liability, not absolute liability. This means such bodies remain liable irrespective of fault, but recognised exceptions to strict liability – unlike absolute liability, which admits none – may still apply on the facts.
Key Points:
- Electricity boards face strict liability, not absolute liability, in electrocution compensation claims.
- Strict liability permits recognised exceptions; absolute liability, drawn from Bhopal-era jurisprudence, does not.
- Clarifies the applicable liability standard for public utility bodies in tortious compensation claims.
Exam Relevance: Important for distinguishing strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher) from absolute liability (M.C. Mehta) in tort law.
Cause Title: Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v. Rekha & Ors. | 2026 INSC 847 | 12 August 2026 | Coram: Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.
Disclaimer: This roundup is for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. All judgments cited are sourced from authoritative Indian legal databases.
– Case Law Decoded Editorial Team | August 2026